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Short course
A two-day, hands-on course on structuring a codebase so that agent-written changes can be trusted — for developers of mission-critical systems, oriented to C++ and other compiled systems languages.
Three cohorts: August 19–20 · September 16–17 · October 14–15, 2026. Two days each, 8:30 am – 4:30 pm Mountain. American Fork, Utah.
This course is designed for developers and technical leads working on systems in which software failure has material consequences: defense, aerospace, automotive systems, industrial control, robotics, infrastructure, medical devices, and finance. Examples are presented in C++, but the principles apply to any compiled systems language, and the course notes explicitly identify which parts transfer to Fortran and which do not.
Prerequisites: working fluency in a large codebase, and comfort working at the command line. No functional-programming background is assumed, and prior experience with coding agents is helpful but not required.
The course provides a small supporting library and teaches the necessary concepts as they are introduced; nothing is assumed beyond the two prerequisites above.
The material is drawn from a large, working, agent-developed system, and its case studies include defects as well as successes: a disciplined mechanism that was abandoned because it had been designed to cost more than the undisciplined alternative; an interface boundary declared in three headers but observed by only two of thirty-seven consumers; and a static check that reported zero violations because a regression had emptied the set of files it examined.
LLMs have changed the economics of software development: code is no longer the scarce resource. Judgment, architecture, verification, and control are. That shift is most difficult in high-assurance environments, where practices built around human-paced implementation and review cannot scale to agent-generated code.
The scale of this shift is worth expressing in numbers rather than adjectives. It is also worth measuring against the most expensive case, so the conclusion does not depend on a favorable discount.
An hour of agent engineering work consumes approximately two million blended tokens. At published list rates for the most expensive model available, with no prompt caching and U.S.-only data routing — the worst configuration you could deliberately choose — that hour costs approximately $31. Under ordinary operating conditions, using a mid-tier model with prompt caching, the cost is closer to $8.
| Per hour of engineering work | Cost | Availability |
|---|---|---|
| Senior engineer, fully burdened | $150–250 | Approximately 2,000 hours per year, after recruiting and ramp-up |
| Agent — worst case: most expensive model, no caching, U.S.-only routing | ~$31 | Available 24/7, with no recruiting, ramp-up, or attrition |
| Agent — typical: mid-tier model with prompt caching | ~$8 | Available 24/7 |
Source: published Claude API list prices, August 2026 — platform.claude.com/docs/en/docs/about-claude/pricing. No enterprise agreement, volume discount, or batch pricing is assumed anywhere below.
| Model | Input / MTok | Output / MTok |
|---|---|---|
| Fable 5 — priciest current model | $10 | $50 |
| Opus 5 | $5 | $25 |
| Sonnet 5 | $3 | $15 |
Three choices are deliberately stacked against the argument: the most expensive model, no prompt caching — in real agentic work most input is cache reads at a tenth of the input price — and the U.S.-only routing premium. Run the same arithmetic on Opus 5 with caching and it lands near $7.50, which is the figure under ordinary operating conditions.
Two limits, stated rather than buried. Deprecated Opus 4.1 lists still higher rates of $15 / $75 and is not used, because pricing against a model no one would build on would distort the comparison. And these are Anthropic rates only; other vendors are not included.
The ratio is therefore 5–8:1 even at the highest plausible price, and 20–30:1 under normal operating conditions. The cost question is settled. The unresolved question is where the risk went.
It moved into the operating model: how do you allow agents to work continuously against a codebase without degrading it?
A fleet operating around the clock can produce more change in a week than a human team can read in a month. The resulting damage is rarely a dramatic failure that announces itself. More often it is erosion: a boundary quietly crossed, an invariant re-derived slightly differently in five places, a convention followed everywhere except the one file where it mattered, or a check that still passes because it no longer examines anything. Each change is individually plausible. Collectively, the codebase becomes worse.
The cost advantage of agent engineering is public and broadly distributed. What is not broadly distributed is the capability to run agents continuously against consequential work without allowing the codebase to degrade underneath them.
Review does not close that gap, and it cannot. A reviewer reads at human speed regardless of how quickly changes arrive, and the failures described above are precisely the ones that often look correct line by line.
Slowing the agents down does not solve the problem either; it simply gives back the advantage you were trying to obtain.
This has the familiar shape of a high-return position. The payout is not free; it compensates for structural risk. The advantage belongs not to whoever first notices the opportunity — a 20:1 ratio is visible to everyone — but to whoever can hold the position at scale.
That is the capability this course builds, and it develops one central argument from which everything else follows: you can delegate exactly as much as your codebase can refuse on its own. Constraint is not the opposite of autonomy. It is the source of autonomy. The engineering discipline that matters now is the conversion of rules that live in a reviewer's head into properties the machine can hold and enforce — so the failure modes described above stop being errors a person must catch and become errors that cannot be written.
An agent encountering your codebase must answer four questions. The course is organized around four principles that answer those questions structurally, each transforming a class of mistakes from discouraged behavior into impossible behavior.
Owning the floor
What may I write?
The wrong code has no valid expression
Owning the shape
What may I reach?
The wrong dependency fails the build
Theorem-carrying code
What may I claim?
An unearned claim cannot ship
Governed authority
What may I do?
An unpermitted act cannot commit
These principles interlock rather than merely accumulate. The connection is most visible when a proven theorem licenses a capability, allowing authority to be earned rather than asserted. It also appears when the system records the rule in force alongside the act it authorized, preventing a later rule change from retroactively justifying a past decision.
The course consists of two days, four principles, and four hands-on labs. Each principle is taught, practiced, and applied to your own work before the next principle is introduced. Expand any block for the detail.
Each participant brings one capability they intend to build into a real codebase. Rather than applying the four principles to disconnected classroom examples, participants make four successive passes over the same capability. The resulting output is a four-part specification of that capability: its types, its boundary, its guarantee, and the authority required to invoke it.
Nothing you produce is collected, uploaded, or retained. You work on your own machine against your own repository. The instructor does not see your source code, and neither does anyone else.
Each of the four principles operates at the level of interfaces, invariants, claims, and authority. You do not need to reveal an implementation to design its algebra, state its guarantee, or determine who may invoke it. This is not a workaround for sensitive environments; it is the level at which the material itself operates.
You decide what you bring. You know your obligations — employer policy, non-disclosure agreements, export control, classification — and we do not. Please choose a capability you can discuss at the level of interfaces and guarantees. If there is any question about whether you may participate, obtain clearance from your own security office, and do not bring classified information. That determination is yours to make, not ours. See the course terms, §4.
Lunch and refreshments are included on both days. Registered participants receive a short pre-work packet on selecting a capability. Choosing well is the most valuable preparation you can do, and it is worth thirty minutes of real thought.
The course is held at the Six Gates Technology offices in American Fork, Utah, in northern Utah County. The street address, parking and directions arrive with your registration confirmation.
Three cohorts, four weeks apart, all Wednesday–Thursday. The content and labs are identical across all three — choose the one your calendar and your travel approval can actually accommodate, and note that you may move between cohorts at no charge if plans change.
August is the first presentation of this material and is priced at $1,600; September and October are $2,000.
Checkout is hosted by Stripe — pay by card or bank transfer and your seat is confirmed immediately. Card details are never sent to, processed by, or stored on our servers. Government and corporate purchase cards are accepted like any other card. Registration is subject to the course terms.
Invoices and purchase orders. Email hello@sixgates.com with your preferred cohort. We will provide a W-9, a quote, or any other documentation your procurement process requires on the same day. Your seat is held from the moment you contact us.
Before you book travel: if we cancel, our responsibility is limited to refunding the fee. We cannot reimburse airfare or hotel bookings, so buy changeable tickets or ask us to confirm the cohort is going ahead first — we are glad to confirm. Full details in the course terms.
Yes, and the course is designed for exactly that. You work on your own machine; nothing is collected. When participants describe their capability to the room, the rule is shape only, never content — what it is, its algebra, its guarantee, its authority. No source, no numbers, no results. Please choose a capability you can discuss at the level of interfaces and guarantees, and clear your participation with your own security office if there is any question — that determination is yours to make, not ours.
The course works unchanged, and the argument is stronger for you. The principles are properties of a codebase, not of a model. A frontier model can sometimes recover from a loose codebase; a smaller one cannot — so a disciplined codebase is worth more to you, not less. Bring whatever you have access to — exercises use both tiers where you have them, and we supply whatever is missing.
No. The course teaches what it needs as it goes, and each participant receives a small working library to build on rather than a reading list. Comfort with C++ and a large codebase matters far more than prior exposure to type theory.
Whichever one you can actually get to. The content is identical across all three, so choose by your calendar and — more often the binding constraint — by how long your organization's travel authorization takes. If you book one and your approval slips, moving to a later cohort is free, so when in doubt book the nearest date. If your process plainly needs longer than the time remaining, register for a later cohort rather than not coming at all.
Yes, and it is a first-class path here. Email hello@sixgates.com with your cohort and say what your process needs — a W-9, a quote, specific invoice terms, or vendor setup — and we send it the same day. Procurement plus travel authorization is usually the long pole, which is part of why three cohorts are scheduled.
No. The principles are general and the exercises run on your code. Examples are drawn from a real system because real systems are the only place these failures actually show up.
Dr. Michael Scott is the CEO and Founder of Six Gates Technology LLC, Chief AI Strategist and Co-Founder of Coreform Inc., and a former tenured faculty member at Brigham Young University. He brings extensive experience in computational science, advanced engineering software, technical leadership, and high-consequence engineering workflows. His current work focuses on governed AI systems for mission-critical technical environments.
Register or email hello@sixgates.com with a question.